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We use a spatial Probit model to study banking crises and show that the probability of a 
systemic banking crisis depends on contagion and that this effect may result from 
business connections between institutions or from similarities between banking systems. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Most of the existing empirical research on systemic banking crises evaluates the 
probability of a banking system going into crisis using Probit models. We use a spatial 
Probit model instead, which allows us to consider the contagion effect between banking 
systems without assuming that contagion exists. The spatial model lies on a web of 
connections between observations, through which instability waves propagate, 
summarized in the proximity matrix. Two ways of interpreting proximity are 
considered. One is to accept that two banking systems are close because flows of funds 
take place between them, either by way of transactions or capital participation. 
Contagion is the spreading of a crisis to neighbouring economies which are strongly 
dependent and connected. This contagion is based on the fundamentals and 
interdependence of economies (Dornbusch et al. 2000). The other is to identify 
structurally similar banking systems. Here we have what we call a mimetic contagion, 
ie, the banking systems may not be operationally connected, but as they have similar 
characteristics the agents expect that whatever has affected banks in one system will 
also affect banks in other countries and react accordingly. Contagion spreads through 
agents’ behaviour and fundamental connections do not have to necessarily exist. The 
information that a country is going through a crisis causes “wake up calls” in other 
economies.  
 
2. THE SPATIAL PROBIT MODEL 
The spatial Probit model (version “Lag”) is 
 
iiNiN22i11ii Yw...YwYwY ερρρ +++++= βX   (1) 
 
where iY  is the crisis indicator, Xi is the vector of explanatory variables, ρ measures 
contagion, wij represents the proximity between countries (i,j), and iε  is the random 
disturbance. It represents a substantive spatial dependence (Anselin 1999); what 
happens with the i-th observation depends on its links with the other observations.  
 
The other possibility is to consider the links as secondary: the agent’s actions are 
correlated because they suffer influence from a common shock. It is the “Error” version, 
in which λ is the contagion parameter: 
iiY ε+= αX i  with i
n
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ελε   (2). 
Apparently, the differences of model (1) against the traditional Probit model aren’t 
significant; it is just about including a “crisis indicator average” of the remaining 
banking systems in the model. However, this procedure has profound implications in 
the information necessary to estimate the model and in the parameter interpretation.  
 
The elements wij form the proximity matrix.  The matrices we build try to recreate the 
real mesh of connections between banking systems and not through entropy 
maximization, as in Wells (2002) and Degryse and Nguyen (2004). Entropy 
maximization assumes that each element establishes equal relations with all the others. 
This assumption is criticized in the context of a given banking system, and influences 
the reliability of the findings. It would be less realistic in our work for we analyze 
different banking systems, not just one.  
 
The proximity matrix is a proxy for the operational connections between banking 
systems. We use the exports (Wx), disaggregated by destination: countries with intense 
commercial flows are countries with strongly connected banking systems. We use 
exports here as a proxy for the interdependency level of the banking systems, and not 
because international trade is a contagion channel.  
 
A second matrix (Wba) is also built with the objective of measuring the existence of 
contagion by imitation. It captures the similarities between the banking structures of 
each pair of countries via the degree of the restrictions imposed on bank activities. 
Countries with similar banking systems exhibit equivalent values and therefore the 
distance between them is smaller.  
 
3. DATASET AND VARIABLES 
 
The sample includes information for 87 countries in the year 1998, and the following 
variables: CRIS = 1 if the country’s banking system is in crisis (Caprio and Klingebiel’s 
2003 chronology is used); Inf = Inflation Rate; GDPg = GDP real growth rate; 
PubExpenses = Public expenses in % of GDP; PCI = per capita income; Dep = 1 if 
there is deposit insurance; ETA = Equity-to-Total Assets ratio; ROA = Return on 
Assets; LIQ = Loan-to-deposit ratio; SDAssets = standard deviation of the log (total 
assets); Quality = Loan loss reserves-to-total assets ratio; CV_ROA = Coefficient of 
variation of ROA; CV_LIQ = Coefficient of variation of LIQ; HighROA = Percentage 
of banks with above average ROA; HighLIQ = Percentage of banks with above average 




The spatial model is estimated by the Recursive Importance Sampling (RIS) method, 
taking the estimates of the traditional Probit as initialization parameters. Results are in 
Table 1, and are structurally more robust than those of the traditional model. The 
inflation rate has a negative impact, as opposed to the one obtained by Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache (1997, 1999). One possible justification may be the fact that the 
sample’s average inflation rate is low1, and therefore any rise allows bank profitability 
to increase (Boyd and Champ 2006). The negative sign of PubExpenses may be linked 
to the frequent use of public expenses as a policy mechanism, and is consistent with 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1999). Countries with higher PCI levels and with 
deposit insurance are more stable (Barth el al. 1999, 2001). Results suggest that the 
minor incentive to deposit runs resulting from the implementation of deposit insurance 
schemes overcompensates the negative effects of moral hazard.2  
 
Countries in which banks have higher ETA achieve greater stability. The negative sign 
of LIQ indicates that a reduction in the average banking system liquidity harnesses its 
stability. Although increased liquidity heterogeneity contributes to stability, one cannot 
say the same in regard to the profitability heterogeneity. Estimates for the ROA, asset 
quality and heterogeneity coefficients are equally robust. 
 
Table 1– Estimation results, spatial Probit (dependent variable: CRIS) 
  
 Wba Wba Wx Wx Traditional  
 Lag Error Lag Error Probit  
Const 5.794 6.891 8.211 6.607 4.473  
 (+9.05)** (+14.69)** (+14.27)** (+14.21)** (+1.50)  
Inf -0.054 -0.062 -0.059 -0.058 -0.039  
                                                 
1 Excluding Indonesia and Romania, the average inflation rate in the crisis (stable) countries is 6% 
(6,6%).  
2 This contradicts the findings of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997, 2000) 
 (-14.99)** (-16.25)** (-16.51)** (-17.19)** (-1.81)*  
GDPg -0.299 -0.314 -0.329 -0.298 -0.204  
 (-25.77)** (-24.16)** (-20.92)** (-25.04)** (-2.71)**  
PubExpenses -0.155 -0.155 -0.171 -0.155 -0.105  
 (-19.51)** (-19.14)** (-19.30)** (-19.05)** (-2.01)**  
PCI -0.022 -0.023 -0.024 -0.022 -0.015  
 (-15.10)** (-14.69)** (-14.18)** (-14.75)** (-1.55)  
Dep -0.354 -0.251 -0.213 -0.303 -0.208  
 (-3.96)** (-2.83)** (-2.34)** (-3.46)** (-0.37)  
ETA -0.047 -0.043 -0.074 -0.046 -0.032  
 (-6.43)** (-5.90)** (-7.96)** (-6.31)** (-0.68)  
ROA -0.444 -0.452 -0.491 -0.438 -0.301  
 (-19.10)** (-19.06)** (-18.16)** (-18.49)** (-1.98)**  
LIQ -0.028 -0.029 -0.027 -0.027 -0.018  
 (-10.94)** (-10.98)** (-10.39)** (-10.53)** (-1.13)  
SDAssets 0.236 0.217 0.204 0.260 0.180  
 (+2.53)** (+2.32)** (+2.12)** (+2.78)** (+0.29)  
Quality -0.010 -0.013 -0.035 -0.012 -0.009  
 (-3.01)** (-3.05)** (-2.16)** (-2.91)** (-0.33)  
CV_ROA -0.032 -0.031 -0.035 -0.032 -0.022  
 (-6.71)** (-6.53)** (-5.89)** (-6.61)** (-0.71)  
CV_LIQ 1.336 1.344 1.814 1.374 0.945  
 (+7.83)** (+7.93)** (8.38)** (+8.02)** (+0.87)  
HighROA -0.004 -0.002 -0.009 -0.003 -0.002  
 (-1.54) (-0.72) (-2.84)** (-0.92) (-0.12)  
HighLIQ -0.049 -0.051 -0.048 -0.048 -0.032  
 (-13.59)** (-13.69)** (-13.11)** (-13.24)** (-1.39)  
ρ -0.479  0.31    
 (-1.89)*  (+7.81)**    
λ  -1.056  0.004   
  (-7.27)**  (+0.05)   
n 87 87 84 84 87  
** and * indicates statistical significance at 5% (or less) and 10%, respectively. 
 
Finally, the ρ estimate associated with the Wx matrix is positive, and negative in the 
sample “Banking Activity”.3 Thus, if a country is in crisis this increases the probability 
of neighbouring countries being equally affected. Contagion motivated by a common 
shock is only confirmed with the sample “Banking Activity”. 
 
4.1.  MARGINAL EFFECTS  
 
In the traditional model a one-unit increase in GDPg, for example, will cause a 0.203 
latent variable decrease in the same country. The impact on all the other countries is 
null. In the spatial Probit model, that one-unit increase immediately causes a reduction 
                                                 
3 The sign of ρ adequately varies according to the use of a distance matrix (negative) or a proximity 
matrix (positive). Wba is a distance matrix; the bigger wij the bigger is the distance between observations 
(i,j), and so it is expected that the occurrence of a crisis becomes less likely when the distance increases. 
(between 0.329 and 0.298-units, depending on the model) in the latent variable. 
However, because the banking systems are interdependent, whatever affects one country 
has repercussions in all those connected to it, and these changes will feedback to the 
country where the process began. 
 
The analysis of the impact matrix (Beron et al. 2003) is more interesting than a 
meticulous, thorough analysis of these results. It condenses the importance of the 
connections between banking systems and is given by  
 
( ) 1−− XWI ρ   (3) 
 
where I is the identity matrix. Each element of the main diagonal gives the total (direct 
plus feedback) effect of country i on itself. The elements outside the main diagonal ( ijγ ) 
measure the indirect impact of country j on country i.   
 
The (incomplete) impact matrix for the Lag/Wx case and the GDPg variable is in Table 
2. One-unit changes in France, the USA or the United Kingdom have different impacts 
than those produced by identical changes in Indonesia or Korea. The indirect impact 
that the USA (Indonesia) has on itself is 0.056 (0.001) and the impact of the USA on 
Indonesia is 0.085, while that of Indonesia on the USA is only 0.002.  
 
Finally, while in the traditional model the marginal effects are constant to all 
observations, in the spatial Probit model we have as many marginal effects as the 
sample observations. Again using the simplification of the latent variable, in the 
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Table 2 – Impact Matrix (Lag/Wx/GDPg case) 
 France Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand United Kingdom USA 
France 1.016 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.059 0.057 
Indonesia 0.011 1.001 0.023 0.015 0.010 0.017 0.085 
Korea 0.011 0.006 1.004 0.014 0.006 0.021 0.100 
Malaysia 0.011 0.006 0.012 1.006 0.014 0.022 0.110 
Thailand 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.017 1.002 0.024 0.116 
United 
Kingdom 0.051 0,.021 0.004 0.003 0.002 1.015 0.081 
USA 0.016 0.002 0.012 0.007 0.004 0.028 1.056 
… … … … … … … … 
Average 0.029 0.002 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.038 0.091 
 
 
Thus, in the traditional Probit model the marginal effect of GDPg is -0.203 in each 
country. In the spatial model a 1-unit increase in the USA has a marginal effect on the 
latent variable of the USA itself of -0.347 (-0.329*1.056), and -0.028 (-0.329*0.085) in 
Indonesia’s.  
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
The results from the Spatial Probit model are statistically more reliable, and much more 
pleasing than those from the traditional model. If the observations are inter-related, the 
maximization of the usual likelihood function in the Probit model produces inconsistent 
and inefficient estimators. This probably explains why previous studies didn’t find any 
significant relationship between the occurrence of crises and the characteristics of the 
banking sector (Eichengreen and Rose 1998) or bank liquidity (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache 1997, Domaç and Peria 2000).  
 
Contagion is crucial to understanding the occurrence of systemic banking crises but the 
phenomenon may result from business connections between institutions or from 
similarities between banking systems. Results show little sensitivity to the proximity 
concept used, which could be a sign that the contagion channels are diverse. This is 





Anselin, L. (1999), Spatial Econometrics, Bruton Centre, School of Social Sciences, University 
of Texas. 
Barth, J., G. Caprio, and R. Levine (2001), Banking Regulation and Supervision: What Works 
Best?, World Banking, WP 2725. 
Barth, J., G. Caprio, and R. Levine (1999), Banking Systems Around the Globe: Do Regulation 
and Ownership Affect Performance and Stability?, World Banking, Policy Research WP 2325. 
Beron, K., J. Murdoch, and W. Vijverberg (2003), Why Cooperate? Public Goods, Economic 
Power, and the Montreal Protocol, Review of Economics and Statistics 85, 286-297. 
Boyd, J. and B. Champ (2006), Inflation and Financial Market Performance: What Have We 
Learned in the Last Ten Years?, Federal Reserve Banking of Cleveland, WP 03-17. 
Caprio, G., and D. Klingebiel (2003), Episodes of Systemic and Borderline Financial Crises, 
World Bank.  
Degryse, H. and G. Nguyen (2004), Interbanking Exposures: An Empirical Examination of 
Systemic Risk in the Belgian Banking System, National Banking of Belgium, WP 43. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and E. Detragiache (2000), Does Deposit Insurance Increase Bankinging 
System Stability? An Empirical Investigation, World Banking, Policy Research WP 2247. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and E. Detragiache (1999), Monitoring Bankinging Sector Fragility: A 
Multivariate Logit Approach with na Application to the 1996-97 Banking Crises, World 
Banking, Policy Research WP 2085. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and E. Detragiache (1997), The Determinants of Banking Crises: Evidence 
from Developed and Developing Countries, International Monetary Fund, WP 97/106. 
Domaç, I. and M. Peria (2000), Banking Crises and Exchange Rate Regimes: Is There a Link?, 
World Banking, Policy Research WP 2489. 
Dornbusch, R., Y. Park, and S. Claessens (2000), Contagion: Understanding How It Spreads, 
The World Banking Research Observer 15, 177-197. 
Eichengreen, B. and A. Rose (1998), Staying Afloat When the Wind Shifts: External Factors 
and Emerging-Market Banking Crises, National Bureau of Economic Research, WP 6370 
Wells, S. (2002), UK Interbanking Exposures: Systemic Risk Implications, Financial Stability 
Review 19 175-82. 
 
